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The fatal crash unfolded as two teens, aged 13 and 14, were cruising on a motorized scooter on West 112th Street just before 8:50 p.m.

A violent outburst inside a Simi Valley Target left multiple people injured and fueled fresh outrage over public safety after a man allegedly attacked a woman at random and then turned on anyone who tried to stop him.

A former Jets receiver bust is attempting an NFL comeback.

Shea's biological parents would have preferred to keep the infant as their own, but knew it “would have been an incredibly uphill legal battle," their attorney told NBC News.

It's safe to say Brian Urlacher isn't a big fan of the Bears playing in a dome.

Instead of stopping, the driver fled, leading officers on a pursuit that reached speeds of up to 85 mph on the northbound 5 Freeway.

Is Trump Preparing To "Escalate To De-Escalate" With Russia?

Authored by Andrew Korybko,

He feels personally insulted by Putin rejecting his proposal to freeze the conflict in exchange for a resource-centric strategic partnership and also, whether one agrees with him or not, senses weakness after the US built a “cordon sanitaire” around Russia over the past year.

Trump signed the “G7 leaders’ statement on geopolitical issues” agreeing “to increase the delivery of air defence capacities, additional systems and interceptors, and long-range capabilities. We are also ready to consider extending to Ukraine the benefit of licenses to allow for an increase in Ukraine’s military production…we will strengthen our sanctions, including those on the oil and gas sectors.” This amounts to him preparing to “escalate to de-escalate” with Russia, the reason for which will now be explained.

From Trump’s perspective, which is an explanation but not an excuse in case anyone misinterprets the following, Putin wasted his time these nearly 18 months by talking about peace but rejecting Trump’s proposal to freeze the conflict in exchange for a resource-centric strategic partnership.

Likewise, from Putin’s perspective, Trump reneged on the reported “Spirit of Anchorage” by declining to coerce Zelensky into withdrawing from Donbass in exchange for Putin then declaring a full ceasefire.

Putin accordingly carried on with his special operation, albeit while still eschewing any escalation thereof due to his belief (no matter how outdated some of his supporters think that it’s since become) that Russians and Ukrainians are brothers, which Trump considered to be an insult.

It thus wasn’t the Europeans or Ukrainians who convinced him to renege on the reported “Spirit of Anchorage”, but his ego after he felt offended that Putin rejected his abovementioned proposal to his face in Anchorage.

In retrospect, Trump already had his eyes on Venezuela and Iran once again too, which is why he held off on “escalating to de-escalate” till both of those were wrapped up.

Meanwhile, he implemented his Neo-Reagan Doctrine of rolling back Russian influence worldwide with a focus on Russia’s entire southern periphery in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which completed Russia’s strategic encirclement. A “cordon sanitaire” has now been established around the entire country.

This US-organized geostrategic construct was built in the Arctic-Baltic through UK-led efforts, Central Europe through Polish-led efforts, along its entire southern periphery through Turkish-led efforts, and Northeast Asia through Japanese-led efforts. Trump was therefore almost certainly advised by the deep state that now is the perfect moment to intensify pressure on Russia so as to coerce it into unilateral concessions for ending the Ukrainian Conflict and consequently alleviating some of this pressure.

Whether or not Putin will comply remains a matter of debate, but the aforesaid uncertainty doesn’t mean that Trump wasn’t convinced that now is the perfect time to “escalate to de-escalate” upon sensing what he truly believes to be weakness.

The risk is that Putin finally abandons his belief in the brotherhood of Russians and Ukrainians to reciprocally escalate, possibly even going as far as limited conventional strikes against NATO members to call what he might believe is the big bluff about Article 5.

Unless Russia either capitulates to the US’ demands or there’s a diplomatic breakthrough whereby a balance of interests is reached through a series of mutual compromises, the first of which is improbable while the latter is possible even if unlikely, then a major escalation in NATO-Russian tensions is expected.

Trump ultimately settled for less than he demanded from Iran despite earlier threatening to destroy its civilization if it didn’t unconditionally surrender so he might once again “chicken out” and cut a deal.

Tyler Durden Thu, 06/18/2026 - 23:25

The LA City Council decided Thursday to put a ballot initiative before the voters in November that, if passed, would allow noncitizens to vote in local elections.

The podcast host said her estranged husband is "raring and ready to go."

The podcast host said her estranged husband is "raring and ready to go."

A change of attitude seemed to be exactly what Sam Stevens needed coming into the U.S. Open. He was more than willing to admit that after finishing the first round of the tournament Thursday.

The Cost Of Helium-3: Earth Sources Vs The Moon

When it comes to Helium-3, the biggest cost divide is between Earth and the Moon. Potential sources range from tritium decay and terrestrial helium wells on Earth to lunar regolith on the Moon. Today, Earth-based sources remain far easier and cheaper to access.

This graphic, created by Visual Capitalist's Cody Good in partnership with Pulsar Helium, compares major potential sources of Helium-3 by cost, scalability, and accessibility. It’s part three of four in the Helium 3: From Theory to Opportunity series, delivering key He-3 insights for investors tracking deep tech, critical minerals, and advanced computing.

The Extraction Cost of Helium-3

Looking at cost alone, Earth-based sources currently have a major advantage over Moon-based He-3.

 

Source: Pulsar Helium; CRS R41419 (Shea & Morgan, 2010); Niechciał et al., Energies (2020); Thunder Said Energy; NASA OIG; CLPS contract data; USGS Keszthelyi et al. (2023); Smith‑Vaniz et al. (2026); Interlune..

Values reflect order‑of‑magnitude estimates from market pricing (tritium), thermodynamic separation floors (Pulsar), and CLPS‑based transport floors (lunar), using simplified assumptions for grade, throughput, and infrastructure.

Tritium decay is an existing Earth-based source, tied to nuclear weapons stockpiles. The tritium used in warheads decays into He-3 and is recovered during processing; however, supply is limited by nuclear stockpiles and government control. 

Lunar regolith refers to the Moon’s surface material, where He-3 is believed to have accumulated from solar wind particles over time. Extracting He-3 would involve mining the Moon’s surface material, processing it to release gases, separating the He-3, and then returning it to Earth.

Pulsar sits between these two extremes by accessing Earth-based helium deposits using similar drilling technology as used for natural gas wells. The cost estimate is based only on the theoretical energy needed to separate He-3 from a gas stream, and excludes capex, labour, and other operating costs.

Comparing Source Scalability

Cost is only one part of the He-3 supply story. Each source also has a very different path to scale.

• Tritium Decay: Low scalability, because supply is capped by nuclear stockpiles.
• Pulsar Helium: Moderate scalability, with the potential to scale through terrestrial wells.
• Lunar Regolith: High theoretical scalability, based on a large inferred resource on the Moon.

For tritium, without government subsidies, the price grows significantly further reducing scalability and accessibility.

How Easy is Helium-3 to Access?

Accessibility is the other major difference between Earth and lunar sources.

• Tritium Decay: Moderate accessibility through existing infrastructure, but largely government-controlled.
• Pulsar Helium: Moderate accessibility, with earth-based sourcing.
• Lunar Regolith: Very low accessibility, with no current mining or return logistics.

Lunar He-3 may become more competitive over time, but for now, the only sources available are Earth-based.

Helium 3: From Theory to Opportunity

The rising demand for He-3 is putting new pressure on supply. Though lunar mining may one day become part of the long-term story, the near-term opportunity is much closer to home.

For investors, the key question is not just how much He-3 exists, but how realistically it can be produced and delivered. Scalability and accessibility shape how quickly a resource can move from concept to market.

Tyler Durden Thu, 06/18/2026 - 23:00

James Nicholas has been here before, so he’s doing his best not to get overly excited. 

The singer broke his silence the same night his estranged wife dropped a tell-all podcast episode about their divorce.

Thursday’s first round of the U.S. Open showed why Shinnecock Hills always proves to be a particularly tough challenge. 

The Twins star is giving no time to any trade speculation.

Oscar-winning actor Tom Hanks roasted MS NOW's ratings while appearing in a live interview with a reporter from the network.

The Commanders are looking for a better season in 2026 — and that probably starts at quarterback. 

Pentagon Restores Pacific Command Name, Reversing 2018 'Indo-Pacific' Rebrand

Authored by Tom Ozimek via The Epoch Times,

The Pentagon said on June 16 that it was restoring the name U.S. Pacific Command, reversing a 2018 decision that rebranded the command as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to reflect the growing strategic importance of India and the Indian Ocean in U.S. defense policy.

The Department of War said in a statement that the command, known as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) since 2018, would officially revert to its previous designation, U.S. Pacific Command, or USPACOM, a name it carried for more than seven decades before the change.

War Secretary Pete Hegseth highlighted the move on social media, writing, “U.S. Pacific Command...is back.”

The Pentagon said the decision was intended to restore the command’s historical identity and military heritage rather than to signal any change in mission, geographic scope, or strategic priorities.

“Restoring the legacy USPACOM designation honors the command’s deep historical roots, fostering a sense of pride and collective spirit among all who serve in the Pacific,” the department said in a statement.

The Pentagon further clarified that the command’s area of responsibility, stretching from the waters off the U.S. West Coast to the western border of India, remains unchanged, as does its commitment to maintaining a “free and open theater alongside regional allies and partners.”

The move restores the name under which the command operated from its establishment in 1947 until May 2018.

The Pentagon did not provide a detailed explanation for the decision beyond citing the command’s historical legacy.

The name change quickly drew scrutiny in India.

Nirupama Rao, India’s former foreign secretary and ambassador to Washington, said in a post on X that the key question raised by the decision was whether the United States still viewed India as a “co-architect of regional order or simply as one useful actor among many in advancing American objectives.”

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) is the largest of the Department of War’s six geographic joint combatant commands, with an area of operation that stretches from its Pearl Harbor headquarters west across two oceans to the Arabian Sea. Department of War/Epoch Times Screenshot

Rao said the renaming came amid a series of recent developments, such as “cooler optics” at the G7 summit in France and the deaths of three Indian sailors in a U.S. strike on an oil tanker near the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. military said the vessel had violated its blockade on Iranian ports.

Taken together, these and other developments could suggest a shift toward a more transactional phase in U.S.–India relations, she suggested.

“None of these individually proves a strategic rupture,” Rao wrote. “But collectively they suggest that the exuberant phase of India–US relations may be ending. The relationship is becoming more normal, more transactional, and perhaps more difficult.”

Shashi Tharoor, an Indian member of Parliament and former minister of state, questioned whether the move was a “nail in the coffin” for the Quad, the four-country grouping made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

The Pentagon has given no indication that the change reflects any downgrading of ties with India.

U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth speaks at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore on May 30, 2026. Edgar Su/Reuters

In remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last month, Hegseth described India as “a critical anchor to hold the line” and praised the country’s military modernization efforts and growing defense-industrial cooperation with the United States.

“We’ve also committed to pursuing co-production with India to advance capabilities like Javelin anti-tank guided munitions,” Hegseth said, describing the moves as among a number of “real tangible steps to improve the collective readiness” of U.S. forces.

While the practical implications of the name change seem limited, the decision reverses what was widely seen as a visible symbolic shift in U.S. regional strategy rather than a mere bureaucratic adjustment when the 2018 switch was made.

Then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis announced the change during a command transition ceremony in Hawaii, saying it reflected the “increasing connectivity” between the Indian and Pacific oceans and underscored Washington’s commitment to the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense General Jim Mattis speaks at a Reuters Newsmaker event in New York on Sept. 9, 2019. Gary He/Reuters

At the time, Mattis described the Indo-Pacific as a region stretching “from Hollywood to Bollywood” and highlighted the growing importance of the Indian Ocean to U.S. strategic planning.

Describing the 2018 National Defense Strategy as a “roadmap for the American military,” Mattis said at the time that the strategy “acknowledges the Pacific challenges and signals America’s resolve and lasting commitment to the Indo-Pacific.”

The Trump administration’s 2026 National Defense Strategy repeatedly refers to the “Indo-Pacific” and identifies deterring China in the region as one of the military’s primary objectives. The document describes the Indo-Pacific as the world’s largest and most dynamic economic area and calls for maintaining a favorable balance of power there.

Buildings and structures sit on an artificial island built by China in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea on Oct. 25, 2022. Ezra Acayan/Getty Images

“We will deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation,” Hegseth wrote in the document, which further states that the U.S. military would act to support “strategic stability” with Beijing while focusing on “deconfliction and de-escalation.”

“But we will also be clear-eyed and realistic about the speed, scale, and quality of China’s historic military buildup,” the 2026 strategy states. “Our goal in doing so is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them. Rather, our goal is simple: To prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies.”

Tyler Durden Thu, 06/18/2026 - 22:35

Communities around California and the nation are gathering this weekend to celebrate Juneteenth, the traditional day marking liberation from slavery.