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An Atlanta mom was told she had an aggressive form of cancer and underwent a full hysterectomy – before it later emerged the operation was completely unnecessary due to a lab mix-up, according to court documents. Cassandra Barksdale, 43, learned she apparently had just years to live when doctors gave her the results from another...

France's €107 Billion Deficit Shock: The Next Euro Debt Crisis?

Submitted by Thomas Kolbe

Tuesday marked another low point for European fiscal stability. France, a cornerstone of the euro system, confirmed once again that it remains a leading candidate and potential trigger for a future euro financial crisis.

According to the French Ministry of Finance, the deficit of the French central government amounted to around €107 billion by the end of June. These are staggering figures – a deficit that is 14.4 percent higher than originally planned by the government.

Source

Unless the government builds a fiscal firewall and no economic miracle occurs, the central government deficit could rise to around six percent this year. Not included are the gaps in the social security system, municipalities and regions, which account for an additional significant share of France’s overall deficit. It is possible that the second-largest economy in the European Union will end the year with an overall government deficit of around eight percent.

All budget plans would therefore become obsolete. Last year, the government was already calculating with a deficit of five percent – a figure that, under the originally defined Maastricht criteria, should have triggered an excessive deficit procedure. However, the euro debt club has long abandoned any fiscal restraints.

The problem lies not only on the revenue side. While government revenues recently increased by around 3.7 percent, expenditures rose by 5.4 percent at the same time. The state is growing faster than the economic base that is supposed to finance it.

Despite tax increases and difficult negotiations over spending cuts, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has failed to slow down his country’s debt spiral even remotely.

French fiscal policy can no longer be taken seriously. Forecasts from Paris now have the half-life of the French prime ministers who have failed in increasingly shorter intervals.

The spectacle France is presenting to the world will have consequences. The debt struggle of the Grande Nation no longer concerns France alone, but the entire euro system and the European Union.

It is becoming increasingly clear that European policy over recent years has contributed to a dramatic loss of economic dynamism and productivity. France is facing political paralysis, a president without popular support and the ongoing disintegration of a society that maintains one of the largest welfare states in the world, with a government spending ratio of 57 percent, in an attempt to cover its social fractures.

Cultural alien migration has a price, and sooner or later that price inevitably becomes visible in fiscal policy.

France is also following the German model and constructing its own state economy through debt in an attempt to overcome a never-ending productivity crisis. It is remarkable that this belief in the healing power of central planning can be found throughout the European Union. Has nobody learned the fundamental lessons of history?

The more capital is redirected from the productive sectors of the economy into the construction of a political economy, the poorer the population becomes. This is how socialism works.

We know this pattern from Germany: The state is effectively consuming itself. The greater the damage caused by an expanding state economy in the productive sectors of society, the higher the tax burden and inflationary pressures will ultimately become.

Following this logic, France has raised several taxes over the past twelve months. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu shifted additional burdens primarily onto companies and higher-income earners.

The special levy on large companies with revenues exceeding one billion euros was extended and is expected to generate around €7.3 billion in additional government revenue. In addition, an extended special tax on high incomes is expected to bring in around €650 million. Further measures complete the tax package. Overall, the additional revenues are intended to reduce the burden on the French budget by around €9 billion.

https://www.reuters.com/business/what-is-frances-2026-budget-2026-02-02/

Yet even this fiscal effort is completely out of proportion to the scale of the budget problem. Tax increases are merely treating the symptoms – they do not solve the structural crisis of the French welfare state.

The problems are similar to those in Germany. There are no serious efforts to resolve the migration crisis, no fundamental reform of social programs and no strategy to create new economic momentum through tax relief for the middle class.

France resembles a slow-motion car crash. Everyone sees the collision coming, yet nobody still has the strength to soften the impact.

What happens if the bond market lowers the thumb on France’s creditworthiness?

The rating agencies have already sent warning signals. Fitch downgraded France’s credit rating from AA− to A+ and pointed to the growing debt burden, political uncertainty and the lack of a sustainable path toward stabilizing public finances.

https://www.reuters.com/world/fitch-abaisse-dun-cran-la-note-de-la-france-2025-09-12/

We are witnessing the first signs of a new euro debt crisis emerging on the horizon. Looking back, we must recognize that politics found it easy for a long time to exploit the fiat credit money system and the ECB, integrated into the political process, in order to maintain the illusion of unlimited political feasibility.

Regardless of where in the EU: Politics continues to uphold the illusion that the welfare system has no limits as long as the flow of credit does not dry up.

Reassured and lulled into a false sense of security, nobody questions the political strategy that led to the economic disaster. Yet these quiet times may soon come to an end as interest rates on bond markets continue to rise.

* * * 

About the author Thomas Kolbe, a German graduate economist, has worked for over 25 years, he has worked as a journalist and media producer for clients from various industries and business associations. As a publicist, he focuses on economic processes and observes geopolitical events from the perspective of the capital markets. His publications follow a philosophy that focuses on the individual and their right to self-determination.

Tyler Durden Wed, 08/05/2026 - 05:00

Trump’s rhetoric has been over-the-top, but he's correct: The most important movement within the Democratic Party is in the process of falling under the control of literal communists.

The "Laguna Beach" alum enjoyed a European getaway with longtime friend Justin Anderson after opening up about her recent dating life.

The "Laguna Beach" alum enjoyed a European getaway with longtime friend Justin Anderson after opening up about her recent dating life.

The popular drink will be joined by new beverages and food items and as limited-time merchandise collections.

How Economic Power Has Shifted Over The Past 200 Years

Over the last 200 years, economic leadership has shifted from China to the British Empire, then to the United States, and increasingly back toward Asia.

This streamgraph, via Visual Capitalist's Gabriel Cohen, tracks how the share of global gross domestic product (GDP) held by major economies changed from 1820 to 2025. The visualization incorporates the latest available data from the Maddison Project Database, the COLDAT Colonial Dates Dataset, and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.

All GDP figures are adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), accounting for differences in living costs and production across countries.

The table below shows how each economy’s share of world GDP changed across two centuries:

Economy Share of World GDP (%) 1820 1855 1890 1925 1960 1995 2025 🇨🇳 China 28.6% 21.1% 12.7% 8.9% 5.3% 9.5% 21.8% 🇺🇸 U.S. 2.3% 7.0% 14.6% 23.9% 24.5% 20.7% 14.7% 🇪🇺 EU — — — — — 17.0% 12.3% 🇮🇳 India — — — — 3.9% 4.3% 9.0% 🇯🇵 Japan 3.5% 2.9% 2.6% 3.8% 4.5% 7.9% 3.4% 🇷🇺 Russia / USSR 9.2% 7.1% 5.3% 5.2% 10.1% 2.5% 2.9% 🇬🇧 British Empire / Britain 23.1% 22.6% 20.7% 14.7% 6.3% 3.2% 1.9% 🇫🇷 France 4.8% 5.8% 5.2% 5.0% 4.1% — — 🇩🇪 Germany 4.3% 4.8% 6.4% 6.6% 6.7% — — Pax Britannica and the European Years

Britain was the first country in the world to industrialize. As a result, the British Empire became the world’s preeminent superpower during the 19th century, an era sometimes known as Pax Britannica because of the relative absence of conflict between the major powers.

In 1845, the British Empire, on which the sun famously “never set,” contributed nearly one-quarter (23.8%) of global GDP. India was the empire’s most economically significant possession before gaining independence in 1947.

The table below shows each economy’s peak share of world GDP, the year it reached that level, and its share in 2025:

Economy Peak Share (%) Peak Year 2025 Share (%) 🇺🇸 U.S. 29.7% 1944 14.7% 🇨🇳 China 28.6% 1820 21.8% 🇬🇧 British Empire / Britain 23.8% 1845 1.9% 🇪🇺 EU 17.9% 2007 12.3% 🇷🇺 Russia / USSR 10.2% 1956 2.9% 🇮🇳 India 9.0% 2025 9.0% 🇩🇪 Germany 8.8% 1913   🇯🇵 Japan 8.6% 1990 3.4% 🇫🇷 France 6.6% 1858  

The rest of Europe’s fortunes followed a similar trajectory. The French Empire reached its peak share in 1858, at 6.6%, while Germany peaked at 8.8% in 1913, on the eve of the First World War.

Following decades of war and declining influence on the world stage, several European economies joined together in the European Union. The bloc contributed 17.9% of global GDP in 2007, ahead of the global financial crisis, though its share later declined and was further reduced by the UK’s withdrawal in 2020.

The Fall of Empire and the Rise of the U.S.

If the 19th century was the British century, the 20th was the American century. Like Britain before it, the U.S. became the world’s largest exporter for a time.

World War II marked a turning point in global economic leadership. By 1944, the U.S. accounted for 29.7% of world GDP, the highest share reached by any economy in the modern period covered by this dataset.

American economic dominance was supported by high-value industries and the country’s central role in global finance, manufacturing, and trade.

The U.S. also continues to dominate rankings of the world’s largest and most profitable companies today. It also is still the undisputed economic powerhouse in nominal GDP terms.

The Asian Century

For centuries, China was a center of the global economy. Political instability and its failure to keep pace with European industrialization contributed to a long decline in its share of world GDP during the 19th and 20th centuries.

Beginning in the late 20th century, economic reforms and China’s emergence as a global manufacturing hub helped it regain lost ground. By 2025, China accounted for 21.8% of world GDP, or more than one-fifth of the total.

The full dataset below shows each economy’s share of world GDP for every year from 1820 to 2025:

Year Share of World GDP (%) 🇨🇳 China 🇺🇸 U.S. 🇪🇺 EU 🇮🇳 India 🇯🇵 Japan 🇷🇺 Russia / USSR 🇬🇧 British Empire / Britain 🇫🇷 France 🇩🇪 Germany 1820 28.6% 2.3% — — 3.5% 9.2% 23.1% 4.8% 4.3% 1821 28.4% 2.4% — — 3.5% 9.2% 23.0% 5.2% 4.4% 1822 28.2% 2.5% — — 3.4% 9.2% 23.0% 5.0% 4.4% 1823 28.1% 2.5% — — 3.4% 9.2% 23.0% 5.1% 4.4% 1824 27.9% 2.6% — — 3.4% 9.2% 23.2% 5.2% 4.6% 1825 27.7% 2.7% — — 3.4% 9% 23.2% 5.0% 4.6% 1826 27.6% 2.8% — — 3.4% 9% 22.8% 5.1% 4.7% 1827 27.4% 2.9% — — 3.4% 9% 23.1% 5.0% 4.6% 1828 27.2% 2.9% — — 3.3% 9% 23.0% 4.9% 4.5% 1829 27.0% 2.9% — — 3.3% 9% 22.9% 5.0% 4.5% 1830 26.9% 3.1% — — 3.3% 8.7% 23.1% 4.9% 4.5% 1831 26.6% 3.4% — — 3.3% 8.7% 23.0% 5.0% 4.4% 1832 26.4% 3.6% — — 3.3% 8.7% 23.1% 5.4% 4.5% 1833 26.2% 3.8% — — 3.3% 8.7% 23.0% 5.2% 4.7% 1834 26.0% 3.7% — — 3.2% 8.7% 23.0% 5.2% 4.7% 1835 25.8% 3.9% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.4% 5.4% 4.7% 1836 25.6% 4.0% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.4% 5.2% 4.7% 1837 25.4% 4.0% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.2% 5.3% 4.7% 1838 25.2% 4.0% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.4% 5.5% 4.6% 1839 25.0% 4.2% — — 3.2% 8.4% 23.1% 5.3% 4.7% 1840 24.8% 4.1% — — 3.2% 8.3% 23.4% 5.6% 4.8% 1841 24.6% 4.1% — — 3.1% 8.3% 23.1% 5.7% 4.9% 1842 24.4% 4.2% — — 3.1% 8.3% 22.8% 5.5% 4.8% 1843 24.2% 4.3% — — 3.1% 8.3% 23.0% 5.8% 4.7% 1844 24.0% 4.7% — — 3.1% 8.3% 23.6% 5.9% 4.7% 1845 23.8% 4.9% — — 3.1% 8.2% 23.8% 5.7% 4.8% 1846 23.6% 5.0% — — 3.1% 8.2% 23.6% 5.7% 4.6% 1847 23.4% 5.2% — — 3.0% 8.2% 23.3% 6.2% 4.6% 1848 23.2% 5.5% — — 3.0% 8.2% 23.3% 5.8% 4.8% 1849 23.0% 5.4% — — 3.0% 8.2% 23.2% 5.9% 5.0% 1850 22.9% 5.5% — — 3.0% 7.7% 22.9% 6.0% 5.0% 1851 22.5% 5.9% — — 3.0% 7.7% 22.9% 5.8% 4.9% 1852 22.1% 6.3% — — 3.0% 7.7% 23.0% 6.1% 4.9% 1853 21.8% 6.9% — — 2.9% 7.7% 23.0% 5.8% 4.8% 1854 21.4% 7.0% — — 2.9% 7.7% 23.0% 6.0% 4.9% 1855 21.1% 7.0% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.6% 5.8% 4.8% 1856 20.8% 7.3% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.9% 6.0% 5.1% 1857 20.4% 7.3% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.7% 6.3% 5.3% 1858 20.1% 7.4% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.2% 6.6% 5.2% 1859 19.8% 7.7% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.4% 6.1% 5.2% 1860 19.5% 8.0% — — 2.9% 7.1% 22.3% 6.5% 5.4% 1861 19.2% 8.0% — — 2.9% 6.8% 22.0% 6.0% 5.2% 1862 19.0% 8.3% — — 2.9% 6.1% 21.3% 6.4% 5.4% 1863 18.8% 9.0% — — 2.8% 7.3% 21.8% 6.6% 5.7% 1864 18.6% 9.4% — — 2.8% 6.0% 21.8% 6.6% 5.8% 1865 18.3% 9.0% — — 2.8% 5.4% 21.7% 6.3% 5.8% 1866 18.1% 9.1% — — 2.8% 6.6% 21.7% 6.3% 5.8% 1867 17.9% 9.5% — — 2.8% 5.6% 21.6% 5.8% 5.7% 1868 17.7% 9.7% — — 2.8% 5.7% 21.8% 6.3% 6.0% 1869 17.4% 10.0% — — 2.8% 5.6% 21.6% 6.4% 6.0% 1870 17.2% 9.8% — — 2.8% 7.2% 21.8% 5.8% 5.9% 1871 16.9% 10.1% — — 2.8% 5.9% 21.4% 5.7% 5.7% 1872 16.6% 10.3% — — 2.7% 6.3% 21.2% 6.1% 6.0% 1873 16.3% 10.6% — — 2.7% 6.3% 21.1% 5.6% 6.1% 1874 16.0% 10.3% — — 2.7% 7.6% 20.9% 6.2% 6.5% 1875 15.7% 10.7% — — 2.6% 5.8% 20.9% 6.2% 6.4% 1876 15.4% 10.6% — — 2.6% 5.8% 20.6% 5.6% 6.2% 1877 15.1% 10.7% — — 2.6% 7.1% 20.4% 5.8% 6.1% 1878 14.8% 11.0% — — 2.6% 7.3% 20.1% 5.6% 6.2% 1879 14.6% 12.1% — — 2.6% 6.1% 20.0% 5.2% 6.0% 1880 14.3% 13.3% — — 2.6% 5.6% 20.2% 5.5% 5.8% 1881 14.0% 13.5% — — 2.6% 7.1% 20.3% 5.7% 5.8% 1882 13.8% 14.1% — — 2.6% 6.1% 20.7% 5.8% 5.8% 1883 13.5% 14.1% — — 2.5% 6.3% 20.6% 5.7% 6.0% 1884 13.3% 14.1% — — 2.5% 6.2% 20.4% 5.5% 6.0% 1885 13.1% 13.9% — — 2.5% 5.5% 20.2% 5.3% 6.1% 1886 12.8% 14.1% — — 2.6% 5.2% 19.8% 5.3% 6.0% 1887 12.6% 14.4% — — 2.6% 6.1% 20.4% 5.2% 6.1% 1888 12.6% 14.1% — — 2.4% 5.8% 20.6% 5.2% 6.2% 1889 12.7% 14.7% — — 2.5% 5.4% 20.5% 5.2% 6.3% 1890 12.7% 14.6% — — 2.6% 5.3% 20.7% 5.2% 6.4% 1891 12.5% 14.9% — — 2.4% 4.8% 19.6% 5.3% 6.2% 1892 12.3% 16.1% — — 2.5% 5.2% 19.6% 5.3% 6.4% 1893 12.2% 15.0% — — 2.5% 5.9% 19.4% 5.3% 6.6% 1894 12.0% 14.3% — — 2.7% 6.6% 19.8% 5.4% 6.6% 1895 11.9% 15.7% — — 2.7% 6.1% 19.5% 5.2% 6.8% 1896 11.7% 15.1% — — 2.5% 6.7% 18.9% 5.3% 6.9% 1897 11.6% 16.2% — — 2.5% 6.5% 20.1% 5.1% 7.0% 1898 11.4% 16.3% — — 2.9% 6.6% 20.3% 5.3% 7.1% 1899 11.2% 17.4% — — 2.7% 7.0% 19.7% 5.5% 7.2% 1900 11.1% 17.5% — — 2.7% 6.8% 19.6% 5.3% 7.4% 1901 10.9% 19.2% — — 2.7% 7.0% 19.5% 5.1% 7.1% 1902 10.7% 19.1% — — 2.5% 7.6% 20.2% 5.0% 7.2% 1903 10.6% 19.7% — — 2.8% 7.1% 20.1% 5.0% 7.4% 1904 10.4% 19.1% — — 2.7% 7.8% 19.9% 5.0% 7.6% 1905 10.2% 20.2% — — 2.6% 6.9% 19.8% 5.0% 7.7% 1906 10.0% 22.2% — — 2.9% 6.6% 20.2% 5.0% 7.8% 1907 9.9% 22.2% — — 2.9% 6.4% 19.7% 5.1% 8.0% 1908 9.7% 20.1% — — 2.9% 7.0% 19.1% 5.0% 8.0% 1909 9.5% 22.0% — — 2.8% 7.2% 20.1% 5.1% 8.0% 1910 9.4% 21.7% — — 2.8% 7.8% 20.2% 4.7% 8.2% 1911 9.3% 22.0% — — 2.9% 7.2% 20.2% 5.1% 8.3% 1912 9.6% 22.5% — — 2.9% 7.8% 20.1% 5.5% 8.5% 1913 10.0% 22.9% — — 2.9% 8.2% 20.1% 5.3% 8.8% 1914 9.9% 20.6% — — 2.8% 7.7% 20.2% 4.9% 7.3% 1915 9.9% 20.8% — — 3.0% 7.8% 20.3% 4.7% 6.9% 1916 9.9% 23.1% — — 3.4% 6.8% 20.5% 4.9% 6.8% 1917 9.8% 22.1% — — 3.5% 5.8% 20.1% 4.1% 6.7% 1918 9.8% 23.5% — — 3.5% 3.5% 18.8% 3.1% 6.6% 1919 9.8% 23.2% — — 3.8% 3.0% 16.3% 3.6% 5.3% 1920 9.7% 22.5% — — 3.4% 2.9% 14.5% 4.2% 5.6% 1921 9.5% 21.4% — — 3.7% 2.6% 14.1% 3.9% 6.1% 1922 9.4% 21.9% — — 3.7% 2.9% 14.7% 4.5% 6.5% 1923 9.2% 24.1% — — 3.6% 3.3% 14.3% 4.6% 5.3% 1924 9.0% 24.1% — — 3.7% 4.2% 14.6% 5.1% 6.0% 1925 8.9% 23.9% — — 3.8% 5.2% 14.7% 5.0% 6.6% 1926 8.7% 24.8% — — 3.7% 5.8% 14.4% 5.0% 6.6% 1927 8.5% 24.3% — — 3.6% 6.1% 14.6% 4.8% 7.1% 1928 8.4% 23.9% — — 3.8% 6.4% 14.5% 5.0% 7.2% 1929 8.2% 24.6% — — 3.9% 6.4% 14.7% 5.2% 7.0% 1930 8.2% 21.8% — — 3.5% 6.6% 14.4% 5.0% 6.8% 1931 8.0% 19.9% — — 3.5% 6.6% 13.7% 4.5% 6.1% 1932 8.1% 16.5% — — 3.7% 6.4% 13.4% 4.2% 5.5% 1933 7.1% 15.6% — — 3.9% 6.5% 13.2% 4.3% 5.8% 1934 7.1% 16.5% — — 3.8% 7.0% 13.4% 4.2% 6.1% 1935 7.5% 18.2% — — 3.9% 7.8% 12.9% 4.0% 6.4% 1936 7.8% 19.5% — — 4.0% 8.3% 13.2% 4.1% 6.8% 1937 7.4% 20.5% — — 4.1% 8.9% 13.0% 4.2% 7.1% 1938 7.0% 18.8% — — 4.2% 8.8% 12.8% 4.1% 7.5% 1939 6.8% 19.7% — — 4.7% 9.2% 12.7% 4.3% 8.0% 1940 6.5% 20.8% — — 4.7% 8.8% 13.1% 3.5% 7.9% 1941 6.4% 23.5% — — 4.8% 8.3% 13.7% 2.7% 8.3% 1942 6.2% 25.8% — — 4.8% 7.9% 13.8% 2.4% 8.3% 1943 6.1% 27.9% — — 4.7% 7.6% 14.0% 2.3% 8.4% 1944 6.0% 29.7% — — 4.7% 7.2% 13.5% 1.9% 8.5% 1945 5.8% 28.8% — — 3.5% 6.8% 12.9% 2.0% 6.0% 1946 5.7% 25.9% — — 2.6% 6.5% 12.2% 3.0% 2.8% 1947 5.5% 25.2% — 4.2% 2.6% 7.2% 7.0% 3.3% 3.1% 1948 5.4% 26.2% — 4.2% 2.8% 8.1% 8.0% 3.5% 3.7% 1949 5.3% 25.4% — 4.2% 2.8% 8.9% 8.2% 3.9% 4.2% 1950 5.2% 27.4% — 4.2% 3.0% 9.6% 8.1% 4.2% 5.0% 1951 6.0% 28.2% — 4.1% 3.3% 9.2% 8.0% 4.2% 5.2% 1952 6.4% 27.9% — 4.0% 3.5% 9.4% 7.7% 4.1% 5.4% 1953 6.9% 27.9% — 4.1% 3.6% 9.4% 7.6% 4.1% 5.6% 1954 6.2% 26.5% — 4.1% 3.6% 9.4% 7.7% 4.1% 5.8% 1955 6.4% 27.1% — 4.0% 3.7% 9.7% 7.6% 4.1% 6.1% 1956 6.7% 26.4% — 4.0% 3.8% 10.2% 7.3% 4.1% 6.2% 1957 6.5% 25.7% — 3.8% 3.9% 9.9% 7.0% 4.2% 6.3% 1958 6.3% 24.3% — 3.9% 4.0% 10.2% 6.7% 4.1% 6.3% 1959 5.8% 25.0% — 3.8% 4.2% 9.6% 6.7% 4.0% 6.5% 1960 5.3% 24.5% — 3.9% 4.5% 10.1% 6.3% 4.1% 6.7% 1961 4.1% 23.8% — 3.8% 4.8% 10.1% 6.1% 4.1% 6.6% 1962 4.2% 24.0% — 3.7% 5.0% 9.9% 5.7% 4.2% 6.6% 1963 4.6% 23.9% — 3.7% 5.1% 9.2% 5.3% 4.2% 6.4% 1964 4.9% 24.0% — 3.8% 5.4% 9.9% 5.3% 4.3% 6.5% 1965 5.2% 24.3% — 3.5% 5.5% 9.9% 5.1% 4.2% 6.5% 1966 5.2% 24.6% — 3.3% 5.8% 9.9% 5.0% 4.2% 6.3% 1967 4.9% 24.0% — 3.4% 6.1% 9.9% 4.8% 4.2% 6.0% 1968 4.6% 23.9% — 3.4% 6.5% 9.9% 4.7% 4.2% 6.1% 1969 4.8% 23.5% — 3.4% 7.0% 9.6% 4.6% 4.3% 6.2% 1970 5.2% 22.4% — 3.4% 7.4% 9.8% 4.5% 4.3% 6.1% 1971 5.3% 22.2% — 3.3% 7.4% 9.7% 4.3% 4.3% 6.1% 1972 5.2% 22.6% — 3.2% 7.8% 9.4% 4.3% 4.4% 6.1% 1973 5.4% 22.9% — 3.2% 8.1% 9.8% 4.4% 4.4% 6.1% 1974 5.4% 22.0% — 3.1% 7.7% 9.7% 4.2% 4.4% 6.0% 1975 5.5% 21.2% — 3.3% 7.6% 9.4% 4.1% 4.2% 5.7% 1976 5.1% 21.4% — 3.2% 7.6% 9.5% 4.0% 4.2% 5.8% 1977 5.2% 21.6% — 3.3% 7.7% 9.3% 3.9% 4.2% 5.7% 1978 5.6% 22.0% — 3.4% 7.8% 9.2% 3.9% 4.2% 5.6% 1979 5.8% 21.9% — 3.1% 7.9% 8.8% 3.9% 4.2% 5.7% 1980 5.9% 21.1% — 3.2% 7.8% 8.5% 3.6% 4.1% 5.5% 1981 5.9% 21.0% — 3.3% 7.8% 8.3% 3.5% 4.0% 5.4% 1982 6.3% 20.0% — 3.3% 7.8% 8.3% 3.4% 4.0% 5.2% 1983 6.5% 20.2% — 3.4% 7.8% 8.3% 3.5% 3.9% 5.1% 1984 7.0% 21.1% — 3.5% 7.8% 8.2% 3.4% 3.8% 5.1% 1985 7.4% 21.2% — 3.5% 8.0% 8.0% 3.5% 3.8% 5.0% 1986 7.7% 21.3% — 3.5% 8.0% 8.1% 3.5% 3.8% 5.0% 1987 8.1% 21.4% — 3.6% 8.0% 8.0% 3.5% 3.7% 4.9% 1988 8.3% 21.7% — 3.9% 8.3% 7.9% 3.6% 3.8% 5.0% 1989 8.1% 21.8% — 4.0% 8.4% 7.8% 3.6% 3.8% 5.0% 1990 7.9% 21.5% — 4.1% 8.6% 7.4% 3.5% 3.8% 4.7% 1991 7.9% 20.7% — 4.0% 8.6% 6.8% 3.4% 3.7% 4.8% 1992 8.2% 20.8% — 4.0% 8.4% 3.4% 3.2% 3.7% 4.8% 1993 8.7% 20.6% 15.8% 4.1% 8.1% 3.1% 3.2% — — 1994 9.0% 20.8% 15.8% 4.2% 7.9% 2.6% 3.2% — — 1995 9.5% 20.7% 17.0% 4.3% 7.9% 2.5% 3.2% — — 1996 9.8% 20.8% 16.8% 4.5% 7.8% 2.4% 3.2% — — 1997 9.8% 21.0% 16.8% 4.5% 7.7% 2.4% 3.2% — — 1998 9.5% 21.2% 16.9% 4.6% 7.3% 2.2% 3.1% — — 1999 9.6% 21.5% 16.9% 4.7% 7.1% 2.4% 3.1% — — 2000 9.9% 21.6% 17.1% 4.7% 7.0% 2.6% 3.1% — — 2001 10.2% 21.0% 16.9% 4.7% 6.8% 2.7% 3.1% — — 2002 10.5% 20.5% 16.5% 4.7% 6.5% 2.7% 3.0% — — 2003 10.7% 20.2% 16.1% 4.8% 6.3% 2.9% 3.0% — — 2004 11.1% 20.2% 17.6% 5.0% 6.2% 3.0% 3.0% — — 2005 11.7% 20.0% 17.4% 5.1% 6.1% 3.2% 3.0% — — 2006 12.4% 19.7% 17.4% 5.3% 5.9% 3.4% 2.9% — — 2007 13.0% 19.3% 17.9% 5.5% 5.8% 3.6% 2.9% — — 2008 13.0% 18.5% 17.5% 5.6% 5.5% 3.7% 2.7% — — 2009 13.4% 17.2% 16.2% 5.8% 5.0% 3.4% 2.5% — — 2010 14.3% 17.0% 16.0% 6.0% 5.0% 3.5% 2.4% — — 2011 14.7% 16.6% 15.8% 6.2% 4.8% 3.6% 2.4% — — 2012 15.3% 16.4% 15.2% 6.3% 4.7% 3.6% 2.3% — — 2013 16.0% 16.2% 14.7% 6.4% 4.6% 3.5% 2.3% — — 2014 16.6% 16.0% 14.5% 6.7% 4.5% 3.4% 2.3% — — 2015 17.1% 15.8% 14.3% 6.9% 4.4% 3.2% 2.3% — — 2016 17.7% 15.6% 14.1% 7.3% 4.3% 3.1% 2.2% — — 2017 18.2% 15.4% 14.0% 7.5% 4.2% 3.1% 2.2% — — 2018 18.8% 15.3% 13.8% 7.7% 4.1% 3.0% 2.2% — — 2019 19.4% 15.2% 13.6% 7.9% 4.0% 3.0% 2.1% — — 2020 20.4% 15.2% 13.2% 7.5% 3.9% 3.0% 2.0% — — 2021 20.8% 15.2% 13.1% 7.8% 3.8% 3.0% 2.0% — — 2022 20.7% 15.0% 13.1% 8.1% 3.7% 2.9% 2.0% — — 2023 21.2% 14.9% 12.8% 8.4% 3.6% 2.9% 1.9% — — 2024 21.5% 14.8% 12.5% 8.7% 3.5% 2.9% 1.9% — — 2025 21.8% 14.7% 12.3% 9.0% 3.4% 2.9% 1.9% — —

Together, China and India accounted for 30.8% of global GDP in 2025. Their large populations and lower production costs give both countries greater weight when output is measured using purchasing power parity.

Whether this shift continues will depend partly on how China addresses demographic pressures similar to those facing Japan and the European Union, as well as broader challenges related to productivity and economic growth.

To see how the world’s major Western industrialized economies are losing GDP share, read The G7’s Share of Global GDP is Shrinking on Voronoi, the new app from Visual Capitalist.

Tyler Durden Wed, 08/05/2026 - 04:15

The heartbroken father of four children allegedly murdered by their grandma and mom in an upstate New York apartment ripped the two killers, declaring that the pair deserve a “special place in hell.”  Sarah Myers, 44, and her 64-year-old mother Amy Steadman “conspired in carrying out the murders of the four children [on June 10]...

Piker's past comments included calling Hamas "a thousand times better than the fascist settler colonial apartheid state" of Israel.

Russian missile and drone strikes on Kyiv and the surrounding region killed at least 15 people and wounded 42 others overnight into Wednesday, Ukraine's state emergency service said.

US Expands Strategic Foothold On Somalia's Coast As Yemen Conflict Simmers

Authored by Dave DeCamp via AntiWar.com,

A US military delegation visited the local government in Somalia's northeastern Puntland region on Sunday and signed a deal to expand the US military presence in Bosaso, a port city on the Gulf of Aden, according to the Puntland government.

Saeed Abdullahi Deni, the president of Puntland State, held talks with a delegation led by Maj. Gen. Claude Tudor, the commander of US Special Operations Command Africa.

Maj. Gen. Tudor and President Deni. Source: Puntland government image

"Puntland and the United States also signed a new agreement to expand their cooperation. Under the agreement, the United States will expand its military base in Bosaso to improve operations against terrorism and to help protect maritime security," the Puntland government said in a statement on the meeting.

The US has been operating from a UAE-built airbase in Bosaso, which the UAE has reportedly used to arm the RSF in Sudan.

An expanded US military presence in Bosaso could be used as a launchpad for operations against Yemen's Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, and the deal comes as Ansar Allah is enforcing a new maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea ports, which began after Saudi strikes on Yemen’s Sanaa International Airpoirt, attacks that reignited the conflict that was in a state of ceasefire since 2022.

Tudor visited Puntland a day after meeting with officials in Somaliland, a de facto independent state within Somalia’s internationally recognized borders.

It’s unclear if any deals were signed in that meeting, but Israel recently became the first country to recognize Somaliland as an independent country and is seeking to establish a military and intelligence presence for operations against Yemen.

According to the Somali Guardian, the US-Puntland deal bypassed the US-backed federal government in Mogadishu, which has been at odds with Puntland amid a political crisis sparked by changes to the constitution made by Somali President Hassan Sheik Mohamud. Puntland withdrew from the federal system in 2024, and this year clashes have occurred between forces loyal to the federal government and Puntland security forces.

The US has continued to back the federal government with airstrikes against al-Shabaab, and it has also been engaged in an air campaign against an ISIS affiliate in Puntland, where it backs local Puntland forces.

via BBC

President Trump has overseen a major escalation in Somalia, launching at least 124 airstrikes in 2025, a record number. The US has launched at least 77 airstrikes in Somalia this year, though the war receives virtually no media coverage in the US.

Tyler Durden Wed, 08/05/2026 - 03:30

A beloved North Carolina gas station clerk was killed by a registered sex offender after vanishing from her home, deputies say.

"Ted Lasso" Season 4 stumbles out of the gate with a tepid season premiere, but when it finds its footing, it's the best the show has been since Season 1. 

Holy barbecue sauce, Ted Lasso is back!

Federal prosecutors in Florida have formally asked Argentina to extradite Chilean nationals Ignacio Zúñiga Cartés, 21, and Bastián Jiménez Freraut, 28, back to the US for prosecution, The Post can reveal.

In a recording of the livestream the driver of the motorcycle appeared to fire a gun directly at him.

Which Countries Think They're On The Right Track?

Public confidence in national direction varies dramatically around the world. Respondents in several Asian countries are broadly optimistic, while majorities across much of Europe and the Americas believe their countries are on the wrong track.

This graphic, via Visual Capitalist's Gabriel Cohen, ranks 30 countries by the percentage of adults ages 16 to 74 who believe their country is moving in the right or wrong direction.

The visualization uses 2026 survey data from Ipsos Global Opinion Polls and covers 25,709 respondents.

Asian Optimism in 2026

Asian countries dominate the top of the ranking, accounting for six of the seven countries where a majority of respondents believe their country is on the right track.

Singapore leads at 86%, followed by Malaysia at 74% and India at 69%. Indonesia and Thailand are tied at 62%, while South Korea stands at 58%.

This table ranks all 30 countries:

CountryApproval of Country Direction (%)Disapproval of Country Direction (%) 🇸🇬 Singapore8614 🇲🇾 Malaysia7426 🇮🇳 India6931 🇹🇭 Thailand6238 🇮🇩 Indonesia6238 🇰🇷 S. Korea5842 🇦🇷 Argentina5545 🇨🇱 Chile4852 🇨🇴 Colombia4654 🇨🇦 Canada4555 🇦🇺 Australia4456 🇵🇱 Poland4357 🇮🇪 Ireland4258 🇯🇵 Japan4159 🇺🇸 U.S.4060 🇮🇱 Israel3664 🇲🇽 Mexico3664 🇧🇷 Brazil3466 🇳🇱 Netherlands3268 🇸🇪 Sweden3169 🇪🇸 Spain3169 🇮🇹 Italy3169 🇧🇪 Belgium3070 🇹🇷 Türkiye2872 🇿🇦 South Africa2377 🇭🇺 Hungary2377 🇩🇪 Germany2377 🇬🇧 Great Britain2179 🇵🇪 Peru1585 🇫🇷 France1090 🌐 World4159

Economic momentum may help explain some of this confidence. The AI boom is supporting major South Korean companies such as Samsung and SK Hynix, while India and Indonesia remain two of the world’s largest emerging markets.

Japan is a notable exception to the broader regional pattern. Following decades of economic stagnation, 41% of Japanese respondents believe their country is on the right track, matching the global average.

Pessimism Outside Asia

Outside Asia, most countries surveyed across Europe, the Americas, and Africa report greater pessimism than optimism.

In the United States, 40% of respondents approve of their country’s direction. Israel and Mexico are tied at 36%, while 34% of Brazilians believe their country is on the right track ahead of national elections in October 2026.

Türkiye stands at 28%, while South Africa is lower at 23%. In Peru, which has had nine presidents in a decade, 85% of respondents believe their country is on the wrong track.

Europe’s Pessimistic Outlook

France ranks last overall, with only one in 10 respondents saying the country is headed in the right direction.

Several of its European neighbors also rank near the bottom. In Great Britain, which has had multiple prime ministers since the 2016 Brexit vote, 79% of respondents believe the country is on the wrong track.

Germany also ranks near the bottom, with just 23% of respondents saying the country is moving in the right direction. Economic weakness and job losses may be contributing to the country’s broader social and political unease.

If you enjoyed today’s post, check out Visualized: Approval Rating of Global Leaders in 2026 on Voronoi.

Tyler Durden Wed, 08/05/2026 - 02:45

A North Korean missile unit has begun deploying to western Russia and could be equipped with 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for strikes against Ukraine, an official at Ukraine's military intelligence agency said.

"This means he likely used drugs while flying to Indonesia."

Half Of Foreign Welfare Recipients In Spain Are Moroccan

Via Remix News,

Nearly half of all foreign nationals receiving Spain’s Minimum Living Income (IMV) are Moroccan, according to previously unpublished figures obtained by The Objective through a transparency request.

The National Social Security Institute recorded 139,446 foreign recipients of the benefit, including 69,517 Moroccan nationals.

Foreigners therefore account for approximately half of the nearly 280,000 registered recipients, while Moroccans represent almost 50 percent of the foreign total.

The figures provide the first official nationality-by-nationality breakdown of foreign IMV recipients.

Public statistics had previously distinguished only between Spanish and foreign claimants without identifying their countries of origin.

Romanians formed the second-largest foreign group, with 15,262 recipients, followed by Ukrainians with 4,612.

Colombians accounted for 3,549 recipients, Algerians for 3,362, Italians for 3,043, and Bulgarians for 2,826.

Other recipients included Portuguese, Pakistani, Venezuelan, Brazilian, and Nigerian nationals. More than 100 nationalities were represented overall, alongside 215 people categorized under “other nationalities” and 175 stateless recipients.

The data counts only the registered recipient in each household, rather than every family member supported by the payment. The actual number of people benefiting from the program is therefore higher.

The totals also exclude the Basque Country and Navarre, which administer the Minimum Living Income independently under their special fiscal arrangements.

Social Security data also indicates that around 70 percent of Moroccan women of working age do not formally contribute to Spain’s employment system, reflecting particularly low labor-force participation among that group.

The publication of the figures comes at a politically sensitive time, given the much-reported migrant influx from the Arab country into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta.

Over 50,000 Moroccans are estimated to have entered the autonomous city illegally within the past week, and the number to have since been returned is heavily disputed.

Read more here...

Tyler Durden Wed, 08/05/2026 - 02:00