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IRGC Announces Attack On Another Tanker In Hormuz, As Trump Mulls 'Annihilate Them Or Not' Decision
Update(1755ET): While the White House has signaled it wishes to see 'quiet' in the Strait of Hormuz and de-escalation when it comes to Iran, it doesn't seem heavily sanctioned-Tehran is yet willing to see it that way. Another foreign vessel has reportedly been hit, via Sepha News:
IRGC says Togolese-flagged tanker 'Trend' was hit and stopped after a fire, while it stated the tanker violated Hormuz rules and that the US instigated the transit.
Below is a machine translation of the IRGC statement that was released on Telegram:
Last night, the offending tanker Trend, flying the flag of Togo, attempted an illegal passage through the Strait of Hormuz under the instigation and deception of the child-killing U.S. military; it was struck and came to a halt after a fire broke out on board.
The IRGC Navy warns once again that illegal passage through the Strait of Hormuz will result in nothing other than the destruction of the offending vessel.
President Trump has still insisted the US can negotiate with the Iranians at any time, and that they are "begging" for it.
BREAKING: Just moments ago, Iran struck a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz attempting to cross via the Omani Route.
From Iran’s perspective, it is absolutely CRITICAL that they prove their ability to keep striking vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz given the shutdown of the… pic.twitter.com/oZpxq3ZmIU
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Update(1325ET): Some key lines of President Trump given to Axios on Thursday...
He told the outlet he is at a "critical juncture" regarding the war in Iran, weighing whether to launch massive new attacks or pursue a different path to end the conflict.
He has previously indicated his belief that war will continue through the November midterm elections. Trump has newly said:
"I have a big decision coming up. Do I want to go in and annihilate them [the Iranian regime] or do I not? It's a big decision. Anything could happen with me."
The war is increasingly unpopular among Americans, and Trump's rhetoric has appeared a bit more honest on this of late. What's the end game? After six months of conflict, Epic Fury has looked like a bombing campaign in search of a strategy. According to more of Trump's talk with Axios:
- Trump declined to say whether he'll decide on the path forward before or after the midterms.
- Trump and Hegseth have ordered the military to maintain its level of forces in the Middle East until the end of the year, to remain ready for a potential return to full-scale combat.
- The officials say Trump needs to decide soon on the way forward, partly because the US military can't stay in its current holding pattern much longer. "At some point you have to decide what is the end game"
The situation of global energy transit has over the past week become much more complicated with the Houthis advance across Yemen's Red Sea coastline, and drone damage to Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline. The US looks to be staying on the sidelines of Yemen fighting, for the time being. New via Al Jazeera:
A senior US official told Al Jazeera: We are focused on ensuring navigation in the Red Sea and allowing our partners to manage security challenges.
And yet "partners" like the Saudis and its government in Sanaa are clearly not doing so well.
BREAKING: Yemen's Houthis have dug roughly 20 km of trenches in the mountains above the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, visible on Sentinel-2 imagery, with positions overlooking the strait's narrowest point near Dhubab and Perim.
The Houthi fighter filmed on the Murad coast last week said… pic.twitter.com/0kgmg3FiPE
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Oil prices are falling on Thursday on some headlines signaling potential de-escalation moves out of the Saudi-Yemen conflict, both via Reuters:
- China reportedly presses Iran to help rein in the Houthis after Saudi appeal, according to Retuers citing sources
- Oil prices fell on Wednesday after reports that Saudi Arabia was offering additional crude cargoes through Oman eased some concerns about Middle East supply disruptions, while a smaller-than-expected draw in U.S. crude inventories added further downward pressure.
US crude futures have extended their drop to fall back below $100/bbl. This also comes amid continued reports of better-than-expected recovery in Gulf infrastructure, as Saudi Arabia is claiming it is able to restore half the capacity of its East-West pipeline within merely days. The optimism could prove just wishful thinking, however - and the coming week will tell.
Starting last week, when the Houthis made their lightning-fast advance along the Red Sea coast, fragmenting the positions of the Saudi-backed coalition government, Riyadh turned to Beijing for help, the Thursday Reuters report indicates.
"Chinese officials did not issue any explicit threats or indicate that Beijing would seek to pressure Tehran economically if it failed to use its influence over the Houthis, the three Iranian sources said," the report adds.
The Chinese foreign ministry has responded to knowledge of the diplomatic maneuvering getting out that "China does not wish to see regional tensions further spill over into Yemen and the Red Sea. Escalating regional instability is not in the interests of any party".
"The sovereignty and security of all countries should be respected, and facilities vital to people's livelihoods must not be targeted. China calls for an end to actions that further complicate the situation and urges resolving issues through dialogue and negotiation," it said.
A senior Western diplomat in the region was separately quoted as saying "Beijing is one of the few capitals that can still press Iran to rein in the Houthis."
Given that the Iran-aligned Shia group has often shown a willingness to cooperate and coordinate action to Tehran's benefit, Ansar Allah leadership may listen if it gets a signal to de-escalate from Iran.
🇾🇪🇺🇸 Ansar Allah fighters put American anti-tank missiles on display after seizing them in recent fighting. pic.twitter.com/DKs3QpjeUq
— The Saviour (@TheSaviour) September 16, 2026According to to some Thursday and latest developments via Al Jazeera:
- Yemeni government forces are trying to prevent Houthi advances on several fronts, including the strategic Kahbub mountains near Bab al-Mandeb and Taiz, with Saudi Arabia providing support with air strikes in areas around the city.
- President Donald Trump has told reporters that the US is “hopefully toward the end” of its war on Iran and notes that he has spoken with Iranians “directly”.
- UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urges de-escalation and diplomacy in the Middle East as fighting intensifies in Yemen and between the Houthi group and Saudi Arabia.
- Iran’s national security chief Mohsen Rezaei says the US must take practical steps to earn Tehran’s confidence, stressing that the country harbours zero trust in Washington.
- A UN fact-finding mission has found “reasonable grounds” to believe the US was behind two attacks, including the strike against a school in Minab in February, which it says constituted war crimes.
On the Yemen front, Al Jazeera writes, "The fighting is continuing and government forces are claiming that the Ansarullah Houthis have suffered a lot of casualties in the clashes that are occurring on a number of fronts, mainly in western Taiz and also in Kahbub, which is a mountainous area with strategic importance as it overlooks Bab al-Mandeb."
Throughout the conflict, both the Iranians and the Houthis have at various times said they are willing to grant China and other "friendly" countries like Russia "special considerations" when it comes to water transit and paying "fees" - the latter case related to the Strait of Hormuz.
Tyler Durden Fri, 09/18/2026 - 06:45Bo Bichette’s willingness to change positions could reshape Mets’ infield
The Great Diesel Crisis - How Policy Choices Made The West Vulnerable
How taxes, regulation, refinery closures, sanctions and declining domestic production turned a geopolitical shock into a diesel-price crisis
Do not blame diesel prices on the Iran war or the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. The geopolitical risk premium attached to oil prices is relevant, but the market was already weakened by policy choices.
Europe has taxed motor fuels heavily, imposed escalating regulatory and carbon costs across the supply chain, closed refining capacity, sanctioned major sources of refined-product supply, and discouraged investment in domestic oil and gas production. Today's refined product system is smaller, less flexible and more import-dependent, and, as such, every geopolitical disruption produces a larger price shock.
Diesel prices rise faster than crude because diesel suffers its own supply constraints, and these are politically imposed, not due to a war.
In the United States, retail diesel reached an all-time high of $5.85 per gallon on 4 September 2026. At the same time, the U.S. Gulf Coast diesel crack spread, the benchmark measure of diesel relative to crude, surged to multi-year highs. Therefore, the problem was more the availability of middle distillates rather than crude alone. U.S. refineries were operating at about 98% utilisation, leaving little spare capacity to offset another outage.
Globally, the impact is significant. Current supply losses include refinery disruption in the Middle East linked to the Iran war and reduced Russian diesel availability following Ukrainian attacks on refining infrastructure and export restrictions. All these elements add to the geopolitical risk premium, but they are magnified by the absence of spare refining capacity and the limits to regional supply.
Middle Eastern refinery disruptions have risen to almost 3.0 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia's Jizan refinery, with a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day, was one of the facilities where exports slumped. Additionally, Russian exports have plummeted. Russia was one of the world's largest diesel exporters, but its seaborne diesel exports in June 2026 fell to 426,000 barrels per day from 827,000 barrels per day a year earlier. Refinery damage, domestic-supply priorities and export restrictions all affected the stability of an already fragile market.
However, these disruptions explain the timing of the latest surge, but they do not explain why importing economies entered the shock with so little capacity to absorb it. That is where interventionist policies have created the biggest damage.
European motorists do not pay diesel prices driven by crude, refining and logistics costs. The biggest driver is a tax-and-regulation-heavy final price. Direct taxes alone represented an average of 52.1% of the final price of Euro-super 95 petrol in the European Union, with several countries above 55%. Consumers pay more in fuel taxation than for the crude oil, refining and logistical components combined.
Diesel taxation varies by country, but the same structural tax burden remains. When we add excise duties and VAT, governments have created a large, rigid fiscal floor to fuel prices. When crude rises, the tax-inclusive base increases the final bill. However, when crude falls, large fixed tax components mean that the price paid by households and businesses does not fall proportionately.
The real policy burden is wider than the excise duty displayed at the service station. Costs are accumulated throughout the chain. From royalties and taxes on production; environmental compliance; energy costs and carbon charges at refineries; corporate and local taxes; regulated fees for storage and infrastructure; labour levies; financing costs created by regulatory uncertainty; and compliance costs for distribution and retail, the energy chain is a massive cash machine for governments. Many of these costs are not always shown as "fuel tax," but they are passed through to the final price. Furthermore, the effect is cumulative.
Europe has not merely taxed fuels at the point of sale, it has piled fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs from exploration and importation through refining, storage, transport and retail distribution. That makes the retail price structurally less responsive to lower crude prices and more vulnerable to supply shocks.
The second structural problem is the loss of refining capacity.
The United States did not lose refining flexibility because of one executive order or one EPA rule. It was a cumulative policy tsunami. Obama's air-quality regulations and renewable-fuel mandates added compliance and capital costs, while Biden retained and expanded renewable-fuel obligations, restricted small-refinery relief and reinforced a policy environment in which long-lived petroleum investments faced greater regulatory risk and higher costs. The clearest consequence has appeared in California, where stringent state regulation, expensive compliance and mandated energy-transition policies have coincided with the closure of major refineries. The result is not lower dependence on fuels in the short term, but less domestic capacity to produce them, and greater vulnerability when global diesel supply is disrupted. Fortunately, the United States is not suffering an enormous diesel shortage problem as Europe's, because total U.S. crude-oil refining capacity did not fall between 2008 and 2026, standing at 18.16 million barrels per day.
In Europe, on comparable tax-inclusive retail prices, the EU average is about $8.90 per U.S. gallon, versus $5.97 per gallon in the United States, or 49% higher. Several European markets were close to $10.70-$10.90 per gallon as of September 11th, 2026.
Between 2020 and 2024, European refining capacity fell from about 15.3 million barrels per day to 14.7 million barrels per day, a reduction of nearly 600,000 barrels per day. Europe has lost more than 20% of its refining capacity since 2009. Refineries have been shut, converted to import terminals or biorefineries, reducing conventional crude-processing capacity just when global diesel supply has become more problematic.
A refinery may appear unnecessary during periods of large imports and open trade routes. However, it becomes strategic when imported diesel is disrupted. Closing a refinery does not eliminate domestic demand for diesel. It converts domestic production capacity into an additional need for imported product and foreign refining capacity.
The EU's decision to restrict Russian petroleum products did not eliminate Europe's demand for transport, agricultural and industrial fuel. Now diesel must be delivered from more distant suppliers, with longer routes, high freight costs and more exposure to congestion in the Red Sea or the Strait of Hormuz. Sanctions may have created an indirect boomerang effect, making Europe more dependent. In January 2026, the EU also banned imports of petroleum products refined from Russian crude in third countries, closing the so-called refining loophole. That restricted available supply even more.
Sanctions are justified as a geopolitical tool. But they became very expensive, especially when the EU's policy framework disincentivizes refining investment at home. Restricting a key supplier while shrinking local refining capacity is a dangerous combination, and governments cannot expect consumers and businesses to be shielded from a global refined-products shock. Thus, the EU has created a suicidal combination instead of a security of supply strategy.
Another important aspect is the limits to North Sea production. The North Sea is a mature basin, and its production decline is a reality. UK North Sea oil and gas production fell by 72% between 1999 and 2025. However, natural decline does not make policy irrelevant. High windfall taxation, uncertainty over fiscal terms, restrictions on new licensing and the broader political message that hydrocarbon investment is not desirable reduce incentives to maintain infrastructure, pursue incremental projects, explore and develop viable resources. Such policies may not change next month's global diesel price by themselves, but they have an important impact on supply, investment and infrastructure available.
UK government policy confirmed a ban on new licences for new North Sea oil and gas fields, while allowing some exceptions linked to existing fields and infrastructure. The strategic impact is still clear. A country facing declining production and shrinking refining capacity becomes more dependent on imported oil and refined products at the time when global trade routes are closing.
Domestic crude is not the same as domestic diesel. However, domestic output is essential, as it reduces import needs, supports regional infrastructure and refining optionality, improves the balance of supply during disruption and limits exposure to external suppliers. Thus, abandoning this capacity without a truly scalable substitute is a policy decision with massive security-of-supply consequences.
Europe's policy framework adds more restrictions. Refining is capital-intensive, energy-intensive and emissions-intensive. Carbon taxes, environmental mandates, compliance obligations, high electricity and gas costs, and regulatory risk make investment unviable and closures more likely.
Can it get worse? The next step of the EU framework could add another direct challenge. The ETS2 emissions-trading system is scheduled to apply to fuels used in buildings and road transport from 2027, subject to its implementation rules and safeguards. It is designed to place a carbon price on suppliers of those fuels. This makes a market already burdened by high excise duties, VAT and supply constraints will face another structural cost layer.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism does not directly tax diesel at the forecourt, but it will raise costs for carbon-intensive inputs such as steel, cement, aluminium, fertilisers, hydrogen and imported electricity. Those costs are essential for refinery maintenance, tanks, pipelines, and transport infrastructure. All these political decisions raise the cost of keeping Europe's energy system functioning.
Diesel is not a discretionary consumer good. It is the engine of the real economy. Without affordable diesel, freight transport, farming equipment, construction machinery, industrial logistics, emergency services, parts of mining and maritime activity, and parts of distribution are going to add more inflationary pressures.
The diesel shock does not end at the service station. Higher diesel costs will raise the cost of moving food from farms to warehouses and supermarkets; carrying inputs to factories; delivering medicines and manufactured goods; and operating machinery at construction sites. Businesses already suffering weak margins will pass those costs into final prices. Policy-created diesel inflation creates an economically disastrous second-round effect. This will hit transport, food, goods and services even after the war ends.
A logical energy policy should be focused on affordability, availability, and security of supply. Dismantling the physical capacity that keeps the economy supplied during an energy transition just demolishes the economy and achieves the opposite of what politicians want. The West becomes more dependent and poorer.
Europe cannot tax, regulate and limit the energy system across every stage of the value chain, close the industrial assets needed to process fuels, limit investment in production and then act surprised when diesel becomes scarce and expensive. Developed economies should preserve and modernize strategic refining capacity rather than treating it as a disposable legacy asset, eliminate the cumulative tax, carbon and regulatory burdens that destroy energy competitiveness, and support domestic energy production.
Tyler Durden Fri, 09/18/2026 - 06:30Rule No. 1 at Mamdani’s City Hall: Keep the public in the dark
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GM Delivers Patriot Missile Parts To Lockheed As Rearmament Supercycle Nears
A congressional report recently found that the US has "probably used" one-half to two-thirds of its missile-defense interceptors during its Iran conflict so far, intensifying new concerns about readiness for another major conflict.
The US industrial response is already taking shape to ramp up missile and bomb production to replenish depleted stockpiles as the West enters the early innings of a massive rearmament supercycle.
A Wall Street Journal report said Thursday that General Motors has begun supplying components for Lockheed Martin's Patriot interceptors. This suggests that unused civilian production lines can be retooled for wartime, as they were during World War II, and shows why preserving the auto industrial base is critical in times like these.
Lockheed told the outlet that GM delivered its first batch of missile-housing components for PAC-3 MSE interceptors in August. The automaker produced the parts in three weeks, compared with the months major defense firms would have taken.
At the start of this year, the Department of War directed Lockheed to triple annual Patriot production to over 2,000 missiles by the end of 2030. Meeting that target requires additional output, including, as in this case, tapping automakers like GM.
For GM, retooling production lines for weapons offers another revenue stream during a difficult period for the global auto industry. The CEO told Wall Street analysts earlier this summer that she expected the company's defense unit to generate $700 million in revenue this year with double-digit margins.
Meanwhile, the rearmament supercyclerearmament supercycle is colliding with a critical materials squeeze supercharged by Chinese export supply restrictions and resource nationalism. Missiles, data centers, and broader reindustrialization depend on many of the same constrained metals. Securing conflict-free and reliable supplies will be paramount for the West.
Tyler Durden Fri, 09/18/2026 - 05:45Three students killed in Philippine school shooting, including gunman, officials say
Putin Explains The Rise Of The AfD As The Consequence Of The EU's Systemic Errors
Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,
Putin was asked about the AfD's recent landslide victory in the German state of Saxony-Anhalt on the sidelines of this year's BRICS Summit in Delhi. While politely declining to address the topic directly, he nevertheless said that "all that is now happening across Europe as a whole is the consequence of systemic errors committed by the so-called West, or, to be more precise, by the globalist circles of the West, in the political, security and economic spheres." The rest of his answer elaborated on this.
He described the political errors as a combination of anti-Russian fearmongering and the current German authorities dishonestly invoking the legacy of Helmut Kohl to justify their policies. Putin reminded everyone that Kohl was one of his close friends with whom he often spoke about bilateral ties. According to him, Kohl envisaged the exact opposite of what today's Germany is doing, namely allying with Russia due to their complementarities in order to preserve Europe's civilization and sovereignty.
As for the security errors, these concern the continued eastward expansion of NATO, prior backing for terrorism and separatism in the Caucasus, and current support for Neo-Nazis in Ukraine. Putin also warned that the European elites' plan to deploy troops to Ukraine "would mean war with Russia. And I presume that European citizens understand what is unfolding." The subtext is that this aggressive, reckless, and possibly apocalyptic policy isn't supported by average European voters.
Finally, the economic errors concern the EU's sanctions on Russian energy, which led to the bloc replacing inexpensive long-term gas contracts with Russia with expensive market-priced imports from elsewhere. Prices are now nearly ten times higher than before and "may well rise even further." Putin also criticized the EU's gas storage policies for being "unconcerned with the technical condition of these storage facilities and the physical volumes involved." All of this adversely affects the EU's economy.
All in all, Putin is arguing that the AfD's rise is an electoral revolt against these policies, all of which center on Russia. This doesn't mean that the party or its supporters are "pro-Russian", let alone "Russian puppets", just that they understand the importance of pragmatic ties with Russia for their country's political interests, security, and economic development. Obsessive anti-Russian fearmongering, risking World War III over Ukraine, and dumping inexpensive Russian energy haven't helped Germany at all.
To the contrary, they respectively serve as a false excuse for why the authorities haven't prioritized adequately addressing the problems posed by mass migration, could once again lead to Germany's total destruction, and are raising costs across the board to the detriment of everyone but the economic elite. Simply put, these policies are incredibly unpopular, and the AfD is the largest political force in Germany that's advocating to change them in line with their sincere understanding of German national interests.
A growing number of Germans agree with them as proven by the party's rising popularity, which is the direct result of their authorities' systemic errors over the 4.5 years since the Ukrainian Conflict entered its large-scale phase, but it can also be said that such errors were already being made even before then. Had former Chancellor Angela Merkel and her successors remained true to Kohl's vision, then the AfD might never have become Germany's most popular party, so its astronomical rise is entirely their fault.
Tyler Durden Fri, 09/18/2026 - 05:00