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White Prisoners In UK Being Forced To Convert By Muslim Gangs: Report
Authored by Steve Watson via Modernity News,
Britain's prisons are becoming recruitment grounds for Islamic gangs, with white inmates converting under threat of violence while the system frees terrorists early, jails protesters longer than child sex attackers, and racks up hundreds of millions housing foreign offenders.
New Ministry of Justice figures have exposed a stark reality inside England and Wales' jails. One in five Muslims behind bars is white - nearly four times the 5.8 per cent rate in the general population.
The number of white Muslim prisoners has climbed from 2,767 in 2022 to 3,218 by the end of June 2025, a 16 per cent rise. Overall Muslim inmates rose 14 per cent in the same period, from 14,037 to 16,051, now making up roughly 18 per cent of the prison population despite Muslims comprising just 6.5 per cent of the country.
? Read more https://t.co/b8r0O97xDs ??
— Daily Mail (@DailyMail) August 25, 2026Shadow Justice Secretary Nick Timothy laid out the numbers and the implications. "The percentage of Muslims who are white in our prisons is so vastly higher than in the general population it raises serious questions," he said.
Islamist gangs control many of our prisons.
Conversion to Islam is the only way to stay safe from them.
I obtained data showing 1 in 5 Muslim prisoners are white.
That's four times higher than in the general population.
This cannot continue. pic.twitter.com/G87pfD7EoI
"We know that experts have warned repeatedly about forced conversions taking place behind bars, driven by Islamic gangs. We need to be honest that something is not right here - Labour must urgently investigate and stamp out forced conversions in prison," he further urged.
Government advisers have documented the pattern for years. Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, described Islamist terrorists operating as "self-styled emirs" who controlled prisoners through "leadership and recruitment."
This included targeting "vulnerable or lonely prisoners, using guidance, sharing of food or material gifts" and "conversion backed by implicit or actual violence."
The London Bridge attacker Usman Khan, while inside, encouraged prisoners to take Muslim names and wear Muslim dress while trying to convert others.
Ian Acheson, who reviewed Islamist extremism in prisons, said conversions often occur "as a pragmatic response to who controls power and space in our prisons." In high-security jails especially, safety is at a premium and large numbers of violent young men seek belonging. "So Islam in this case has gang characteristics."
'We need to have much tighter regulation and control of the prison system'
Fiyaz Mughal, founder of Muslims Against Antisemitism, warns the UK prison system is failing to control violent Muslim gangs, leaving staff and inmates powerless. pic.twitter.com/TVdJzSr6Pa
A 2023 government-commissioned review by Colin Bloom found gangs ordering new arrivals to become Muslim or face consequences. "Failure to identify as a Muslim meant that at best the new prisoner would be denied 'protection' from the dominant Muslim gang on that wing, or at worst the new prisoner would be subjected to violence and intimidation from that same gang."
A lawyer who regularly visits top-security prisons reported the process starts almost immediately. "This is something which will happen hours after arriving on a wing. Immediately they arrive in prison they slot into the gang hierarchy. In some cases there are entire floors dominated by Muslim gangs."
Some conversions are opportunistic - "convenience Muslims" seeking extra time for prayers or better halal food. Others are coerced. Qurans left on beds carry a clear message.
The Ministry of Justice insists it does not tolerate intimidation or faith-based coercion and claims prisons act swiftly. Yet the numbers keep rising, and there are now 140 Muslim chaplains compared with 87 for the Church of England.
This is the same prison system that continues to house thousands of foreign national offenders at enormous cost to the British taxpayer.
Figures show 10,487 foreign national offenders costing £629 million a year - money that could fund 16,500 police officers or 15,000 NHS nurses.
Albania tops the list, followed by Ireland and Poland. Deportations remain slow, tangled in missing documents, uncooperative origin countries, and European Convention on Human Rights claims.
Reform UK's prisons adviser Vanessa Frake called the bill "staggering." She noted the drawn-out process: discarded passports, slow diplomatic correspondence, refusals by origin countries, and Article 8 family-life claims. Even a deal to return 200 Albanian prisoners came with conditions and lower daily payments to Albania than the UK pays to keep them.
While foreign offenders and Islamist networks embed inside the system, the authorities have shown a different urgency when it comes to early release.
Zahid Iqbal, convicted in 2013 for plotting to bomb an Army base using an Al-Qaeda manual, was approved for release three years early despite previous non-compliance and warnings from prison and community managers.
Colin Sutton, Reform UK's crime adviser, called the decision "baffling." "This wasn't a guy in his bedroom cooking something up. This was somebody who arranged training. He had links with al-Qaeda. He was a proper terrorist."
Labour's broader early-release schemes have accelerated the emptying of cells to manage overcrowding. Thousands of offenders, including those convicted of violence, have been freed earlier than previous tariffs allowed. Even after partial pauses and exclusions for certain sex offences, the direction of travel remains clear: capacity management takes priority over consistent public protection.
Contrast that with the treatment of British citizens who protest the consequences of mass migration or speak out online. Lucy Connolly, already imprisoned for a single X post after the Southport attacks, faced the threat of recall to prison for reposting a satirical comment about Donald Trump and Keir Starmer. Probation officials treated the joke as "inciting violence" after an anonymous complaint.
In Essex, protests outside an asylum hotel housing Ethiopian migrant Hadush Kebatu erupted after he sexually assaulted a 14-year-old girl and a woman. Kebatu received 12 months. British protesters involved in the subsequent disorder received far longer terms.
Charlie Land got 32 months. Jonathan Glover got 30 months. Lee Gower, a local father and youth football coach, received two years and nine months. Other locals drew sentences of 22 to 33 months. Combined custodial terms for several of them exceeded 17 years - longer than the perpetrator who triggered the unrest.
Judges stressed that violence against police is unacceptable. Yet the sentencing disparity is unmistakable. Locals reacting to a sexual assault on a child by a small-boat arrival spend more time inside than the man who committed the assault.
Meanwhile white prisoners report pressure to convert for survival, foreign national offenders cost hundreds of millions, and convicted terrorists walk early under capacity rules.
Prisons reflect the wider failures of open borders and selective enforcement. Gangs exploit the vacuum. Vulnerable inmates adapt or suffer. Taxpayers foot the bill.
Ordinary Britons who notice and object face the sharp end of the law. The figures on white Muslim prisoners are not a statistical curiosity. They are the measurable result of a system that has lost control of its own institutions.
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The Penal Leviathan: What Wacquant And Rothbard Reveal About Modern Punishment
Authored by Luc Lelièvre via Mises Institute,
Loïc Wacquant and Murray Rothbard come from completely different worlds. Wacquant, in Punishing the Poor (2009), analyzes how modern states manage marginalized populations through policing and incarceration. Rothbard, in The Ethics of Liberty (1982), argues that the state is a monopoly of coercion and that real justice means restitution to victims rather than punishment imposed by the government. At first glance, they seem to have nothing in common. Yet, when you look closely at what each says about crime and punishment, they describe remarkably similar institutional dynamics: a penal system that does not exist to deliver justice but to maintain political power, control vulnerable communities, and satisfy the public's desire for punishment.
Wacquant argues that modern punishment targets not crime itself but people with low incomes. In Punishing the Poor, he writes that "it is not so much crime that is being fought, but the poor themselves." He attributes this dynamic to welfare retrenchment and what he interprets as neoliberal restructuring. This is Wacquant's interpretation. My purpose here is not to defend or refute it, but to summarize his institutional analysis and compare it with Rothbard's critique of state power. Wacquant's central point is that the penal system expands as social protections shrink, turning prisons into warehouses for people pushed out of the labor market. He portrays the United States as an expansive apparatus of social control in which punishment falls primarily on street crime while much white-collar wrongdoing is managed through administrative and legal processes.
Rothbard approaches the issue from a different angle. For him, crime is fundamentally an aggression against a person or their property. Justice should repair the victim. That means restitution - returning what was taken, plus a penalty for the harm done. In Rothbard's view, prison is a double injustice. It fails to compensate the victim and forces taxpayers to pay for the criminal's room and board. As one Mises Institute essay summarizes, "the victim receives nothing and is then 'robbed' once more through taxes to feed and house the criminal." Rothbard sees the prison system as wasteful, immoral, and fundamentally misaligned with justice. His alternative is clear: restitution, even if it must be paid through supervised work when the offender has no money.
Rothbard's critique is not only moral but also economic. In his landmark article "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968), Gary Becker reached a similar conclusion from a different perspective. Every sanction carries costs as well as benefits, and incarceration is among the most expensive. If restitution, fines, or compensated labor can deter crime while restoring victims, prison becomes difficult to justify except for dangerous offenders. Becker's analysis complements Rothbard's argument by showing that restitution is not merely ethically preferable - it is also economically superior.
Wacquant and Rothbard share an understanding of the state's role. Wacquant views the penal state as a bureaucratic arm of what he calls neoliberal governance, used to control marginalized populations. Rothbard views the penal state as a predatory institution that thrives on coercion. Both agree that the penal system tends to neglect victims, expand state power, and generate political legitimacy rather than genuine justice.
Their agreement becomes even more striking when viewed through the lens of institutional incentives. A penal bureaucracy does not merely administer justice; it sustains a network of police agencies, prosecutors, correctional officers, prison contractors, and public budgets, all of whose continued existence depends on the expansion of penal institutions. Restitution threatens this logic by shifting attention from the state to the victim. A system centered on repairing private harm requires fewer bureaucracies and leaves less room for political theater. From this perspective, incarceration persists not merely because citizens demand punishment, but because governments have institutional incentives to provide it.
René Girard, in Violence and the Sacred (1972), helps explain how punishment operates. Girard argues that societies have always used scapegoats to relieve social tension. In modern times, the criminal becomes that scapegoat, and the prison becomes the altar. As one Mises Institute essay notes, "the real product of the penal system is collective catharsis." Punishment is not a rational policy, it is a ritual. This is why voters demand harsher penalties even when prisons fail. This is why mass incarceration persists despite its cost and lack of results. Punishment satisfies a symbolic need, not a practical one.
Girard also helps explain why governments find this ritual politically useful. If societies repeatedly seek symbolic victims to restore social cohesion, the state becomes the institution that organizes and legitimizes those sacrifices. Public fear creates demand for punishment; political institutions supply it. Rothbard exposes the institutional side of this relationship, while Girard reveals its anthropological foundation. Together, they show how emotional expectations and bureaucratic incentives reinforce each other, enabling the penal system to expand even when it fails to reduce crime or compensate victims.
This is where Rothbard offers something Wacquant does not: a way out. Restitution replaces the sacrificial logic of punishment with a logic of repair. It shifts the focus from the offender to the victim, closes the moral account rather than leaving it open, and satisfies the need for justice without feeding the bureaucratic machine. In To Serve and Protect (1990), Bruce Benson shows that pre-state legal systems, such as Anglo-Saxon weregild, relied on restitution to prevent feuds and maintain peace. These systems worked because they focused on compensation rather than punishment.
Wacquant advocates "radical penal minimalism," a model that narrows the scope of punishment while preserving its democratic legitimacy. Rothbard calls for a justice system based on restitution rather than incarceration. Girard calls for an end to sacrificial violence. Benson shows how restitution can be implemented. Becker argues that incarceration is often less economically efficient than restitution, fines, and other alternative sanctions.
Despite their profound philosophical disagreements, all five raise serious doubts about the effectiveness and legitimacy of a prison-centered model of justice. Becker questions its efficiency. Benson presents historical alternatives. Girard exposes its sacrificial logic. Wacquant reveals its bureaucratic expansion. Rothbard offers restitution as a principled alternative.
The penal Leviathan will not disappear through abolitionist slogans or bureaucratic reforms. It will disappear only when justice ceases to be a ritual of punishment and becomes a process of repair. That requires reexamining the assumption that crime should be understood primarily as an offense against the state rather than as an injury to identifiable victims. Once the victim again becomes the central figure in justice, restitution naturally replaces punishment as the primary objective.
As long as governments monopolize punishment, they retain incentives to expand the penal apparatus, regardless of its effectiveness. Restitution reverses that logic. It limits bureaucratic power, restores the victim to the center of justice, and transforms punishment from a political ritual into a genuine process of moral and legal repair. Whether approached through sociology, economics, anthropology, or libertarian political philosophy, the victim - not the state - emerges as the indispensable starting point for any coherent theory of justice.
Tyler Durden Wed, 08/26/2026 - 23:33