The Trans Delusion: A Philosophical Nail In Its Coffin
Authored by Chris Milton via The Daily Sceptic
The arguments in philosopher Thomas Nagel’s seminal 1974 essay ‘What is it Like to be Bat?‘ can help us answer the question of whether a human born with XY chromosomes and a male body can be, can become or can know what it’s like to be a woman, or can know what inhabiting the world is like for a woman. Nagel - who randomly chose bats from the list of mammals - began from the premise that if an organism has consciousness then there is something that it is like to be that organism, and his question was whether we could know “what is like for a bat to be a bat”.
Nagel’s essay argues for the wholly subjective character of experience, and how this subjectivity is dictated by differences in the physicality of beings. A creature shapes its Umwelt, or lifeworld, through its interactions with the world, and those interactions are determined by that creature’s body. Men and women inhabit similar yet profoundly different Umwelts. The qualia of sensation — meaning the instances of subjective experience, such as what it’s like to perceive a colour, to taste an apple or hear a baby cry — are different for each individual human. But these differences are also sexed. The last is a good example, as the female body — and therefore mind — responds to a baby’s cry in a radically different way to a man’s. But there are also large differences in the way they experience running for five hundred metres, the colour red, having a nipple touched, and innumerable other things (almost everything, in fact). There are qualia that each sex experiences that the other will never be able experience at all, but which help form their consciousnesses. A woman will never get an erection, and a man will never have a clitoral or vaginal orgasm, menstruate or give birth.
All of these ways of experiencing the world physically, along with our anticipations and memories of them, form a human being’s consciousness, its personality, its very being (or soul, if you like), who he or she is. If one, or even half a dozen of the physical particularities of a woman could be miraculously reproduced in a man (which they can’t), such as giving him the same muscle mass and bone density as a woman, a uterus, a clitoris or a brain that reacts in the same way to temperature or noise, he still wouldn’t be a woman physically, or anywhere near being one. Consciousness is a complex feature of evolutionarily determined biological systems, the latter radically different for men and women, such that even their spatial and temporal perspectives for experiencing the world are different.
For a man to become a woman everything, every molecule, would have to be changed, and a lifetime of memories implanted. Each moment-to-moment sequence of experience from the womb onwards grows coherently out of those that preceded it and determines those that follow it. Surgery is merely an in-real-life filter, advanced dressing up, and transitions someone towards nothing that meaningfully resembles a woman. To give one of hundreds of examples: men have no Cooper’s Ligament, which means that after HRT their breasts – which in any case are functionless – will be tubular and spaced very widely apart. Even the cells of men and women are biochemically different and determine, from before birth, many things, including how each sex fights particular diseases. Objective, unchangeable, sexed physical states partially determine subjective states; lopping off this or that part of the body or appending a functionless simulacrum of another will in no wise change the quality of those subjective states.
Every cell in our body has your male or femaleness inscribed within it. Even if it were possible to change your hormonal sex completely (which it isn’t) that would still leave your unalterable chromasomal sex, and your genetic sex, intact. There are many male and female brain circuits that behave very differently, sex-recognition is hard-wired into our brains, and the neurons have been identified that allow us ‘instinctively’ to discern a member of the opposite sex, however heavily disguised: this is why no trans people ever really ‘pass’.
So, a man can never become a woman physically, and thus cannot logically be or ‘identify as’ a woman, as you can only know what it feels like to be a thing if you are that thing. To argue otherwise, that there is another, ‘real’ self within us distinct from the bodily self, and that the mind and body are separate?, is philosophically centuries out of date – Locke’s empiricism first put pay to Cartesian dualism almost 350 years ago. “Mental states,” Nagel adds, “are states of the body, and mental events are physical events”: the ghost is the machine, the machine is the ghost. The hormonal impregnation of the foetus has a direct effect on neural circuits, creating a masculine brain and a feminine brain, which can be distinguished from each other anatomically and biochemically, and cannot be housed in the body of the other sex, it being determined by the sexed body. Let’s look at a passage of Nagel and replace ‘bats’ with ‘women’:
Even if [men] could transform over time into [women] their brains would not have worked as [women’s] brains from birth, and could therefore never have the mindset of a [woman]. … It is doubtful that any meaning could be attached to the supposition that I should possess the internal neuropsychological constitution of a [woman]. … Even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a [woman], nothing in my present condition enables me to imagine what the experience of such a future stage of myself thus metamorphosed would be like.
and,
To the extent that I could look and behave like a [woman] without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences would [still] not be anything like the experiences of [women].
It is then, the much vaunted ‘lived experience’ that militates against the possibility of transgenderism. Nagel goes on to give the example of trying to attain knowledge of what it is like to be blind or deaf (he could just as easily have substituted disabled, or schizophrenic), concluding that “the subjective experiences of a person deaf or blind from birth are not accessible to me… we cannot form more than a schematic notion of what it would be like”.
Nagel says that “the more different from oneself the other experiencer is, the less success you can expect in your guesswork”. So, men can come close to guessing what it is like to be woman. Men and women both experience hunger, sexual desire, boredom and aesthetic pleasure, but the way they experience those things is qualitatively different, and unalterably so. Nagel writes that “there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in human language”, and that “to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of logical dissonance”. In other words, the subjectivity of other beings is ultimately ineffable and irreducible to language, and so the subjective experiences of men and women will always be unknowable for each other.
The idea that someone, by adopting the outward and trivial indicators of femininity, can suddenly thereby have access to that knowledge is preposterous. Men can only guess, and approach knowledge through empathy, imagination and the testimonies of women themselves. “Nobody has yet devised,” Nagel writes, “an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy and imagination — that could describe, at least in part, the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to a being incapable of having those experiences.”
Men and women are restricted by the resources of their own sexed minds, their consciousnesses made sexed by their sexed bodies. To deny that they are sexed is not only contra accepted biology, as well as common sense, it would also completely undermine the discipline of evolutionary biology.
The belief that ‘trans women are women’ makes a belief in magic seem sophisticated, because belief in magic or miracles explained effects for which causes could not (yet) be identified, but there was at least an observable effect to be explained. Likewise, when people believed erroneously that the world was flat, they did so because the world looked flat. With trans women, there is no such observable effect. What you have before you after saying the magic formula ‘trans women are women’ is visibly still a man. At best, after the surgical removal of his genitalia, a man will have a crude cavity, its position and its condition of being a hole with a surgically fashioned ‘clitoris’ being the only things it has in common with a woman’s vagina, and yet it is the only part of a woman’s reproductive system that it’s even possible to crudely mimic. This is why the word ‘trans’ itself is inadmissible, as there isn’t a transition towards or into anything.
The feeling inside that one is male or female is biologically determined, the idea of ‘being in the wrong body’ has no concrete, observable, provable basis: ‘male’ and ‘female’ are ‘assigned’ at birth, or rather conception, but by Nature, not by a doctor or midwife. One cannot move from the fixed point of being male or female and back again, so the idea of gender fluidity, of being non-binary is illogical, impossible, mad. A big difference between men and women lies in their reproductive organs, in their potential reproductive roles, and in the reproductive apparatus that produces sperm or eggs, so that ultimately many social determinations regarding gender are biologically determined. This is why, until very recently, sex and gender were used interchangeably: for there to be a third gender, there would need to be a new, third reproductive function, and new organs to go with it. Arguments that sexual dimorphism can be overcome or does not exist are pure Lysenkoism, and matters of ideology, not science. Gender theorists wanted to separate sex and gender, but it simply can’t be done.
To have given this matter philosophical consideration is to have given it way more than its due, and to have accorded the adherents of trans ideology more respect than they are due, and has necessitated the bracketing of matters such as the data showing that it is in part a social contagion, that its are roots in pornography and autogynephilia, that it’s funded by a small group of trans billionaires, that it’s a multi-billion dollar business, and that its explosion amongst the young is closely tied to social media, beginning with MySpace and Tumblr, then via Instagram, YouTube and TikTok.
The one thing that trans ideology has done more than anything else, that will outlast it, is to have made a nonsense of the idea of human progress, other than technological-scientific progress. It is perhaps the most profound manifestation of human credulousness and stupidity in history, outdoing even the witch craze of the 17th century. It is more egregious than any previous superstition or mass insanity because it is has come well after the end of the age of superstition and the advent of Enlightenment. The ‘truths’ of science have always been subject to suspicion and revision, but trans ideology has never had its Hegelian ‘moment’ of temporary truth that was later abandoned as more information came to light. Quite the opposite: it is wholly retrogressive, an attempt to replace biological knowledge with magical thinking, a regression to something lower even than pseudoscience.
Tyler Durden Sat, 05/16/2026 - 21:00